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Gavrich: Constitutional Law: Judicial Oversights—Inconsistency in Supreme

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: JUDICIAL
OVERSIGHTS-INCONSISTENCY IN SUPREME COURT
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005)
Jessica Gavrich*
Texas State Capitol grounds contain a display of seventeen monuments
and twenty-one historical markers. 1 Amidst the monuments, Texas state
officials erected a six-foot high and three and one-half foot wide structure
inscribed with the Ten Commandments.2 The State accepted the
monument from the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a national civic
organization.3 Forty years after the erection of the monument, Petitioner 4
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the District Court for the Western
District of Texas seeking a declaration that the monument violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment5 and an injunction for its
removal.6 The district court ruled against the Petitioner and held that the
* To my mother and father, Deborah and Jeffrey, and my sister, Jennifer, whose love &
support I cherish deeply.
1. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005). The monuments included in the
display are the following: Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer
Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard,
Ten Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman, The Boy Scouts'
Statute of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War
I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers. Id. at 2858 n. 1.
2. Id. at 2858. The monument also includes other religious inscriptions. Id. Carved above
the text of the Commandments is an eagle holding the American flag, two smaller tablets inscribed
with a depiction of an ancient script, and an eye inside of a pyramid. Id. Below the text of the
Commandments are two Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and Rho, representing Christ. Id.
3. Id. In their purpose of combating juvenile delinquency, the Eagles sought to emphasize
the Commandments' role in shaping civil morality. Id. at 2876 (Breyer, J., concurring). "These
plaques and monoliths have been presented by the Eagles to promote youth morality and to help
stop the alarming increase in [juvenile] delinquency." Id. at 2878 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1995). Other justices claimed that the Eagles sought to convey a
religious message. Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting).
According to their website, the Eagles' mission statement is as follows: "The Fraternal Order
of Eagles, an international non-profit organization, unites fraternally in the spirit of liberty, truth,
justice and equality, to make human life more desirable by lessening its ills, and by promoting
peace, prosperity, gladness and hope." Fraternal Order of Eagles International Website,
http://www.foe.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2005).
4. Petitioner, Thomas Van Orden, is a resident of Austin and a native Texan. Van Orden,
125 S.Ct. at 2858. Van Orden also holds a law degree from Southern Methodist University. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
6. Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2858.
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monument did not contravene the Establishment Clause. 7 Petitioner
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which
affirmed.8
The United States Supreme Court affirmed 9 and HELD that the
monument did not contravene the Establishment Clause.10 Further, the
Court determined that the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman was not the
proper test for deciding whether the monument violated the Establishment
consistent with
Clause." Instead, the plurality applied an alternative test
12
Chambers.
v.
Marsh
of
test
tradition"
and
the "history
Over the years, the Supreme Court has considered various
Establishment Clause challenges, upholding some13 and invalidating
others 14 under the Establishment Clause. However, despite numerous
opportunities to clarify its position, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
remarkable inconsistency.15 The Court set forth the foundational

7. Id. Applying the three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the court
determined that the legislature had a valid, secular purpose in installing the monument. Van Orden
v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 WL 3273462, at *4 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 2,2002), affd, 351 F.3d
173 (5th Cir. 2003). Under the second prong of Lemon, the court concluded that the monument did
not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. Id. at *5. The District Court
did not consider the third prong of the Lemon test since the Petitioner conceded this point. Id. at *3.
8. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003).
9. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2861 (plurality opinion).
12. Id.; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,786, 790-92 (1983).
13. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644, 645 (2002) (upholding a school
voucher program); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (allowing
religious school groups to use school facilities); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,208-09 (1997)
(upholding a program which allowed public employees to teach remedial classes at a religious
school); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 824,846 (1995)
(holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar disbursement of funds from student activity
fees to religious organizations); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993)
(permitting a public school district to provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student at a
Catholic high school); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-71, 687 (1984) (upholding a
municipality's Christmas display including a nativity scene); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
784-85, 792-93 (1983) (maintaining legislative prayer).
14. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,301(2000) (holding unconstitutional
student-initiated and student-led prayer at school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
599 (1992) (invalidating school sponsored graduation prayers); County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding the display of a lone nativity in a
courthouse unconstitutional but permitting the display of a menorah outside of a state building);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a law mandating a
creationism curriculum when evolution was taught); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985)
(rejecting a law mandating a daily minute of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer).
15. See generally Adam C. Calinger, OriginalIntent & The Ten Commandments: Giving
Coherency to Ten Commandments Jurisprudence,3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 270-82 (2005)
(discussing Establishment Clause jurisprudence over the past fifty years).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/5
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Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.16 In Lemon, the Court
considered the validity of two state statutes providing state aid to churchrelated elementary and secondary schools.17 Under the first statute, i" the
state provided a fifteen percent supplement of teachers' salaries in
nonpublic elementary schools.1 9 The other statute2" authorized state
reimbursement to nonpublic schools of the cost of teacher salaries and
instructional materials in secular subjects. 2' To ensure separation between
church and state, both statutes contained strict restrictions.22 The Rhode
Island district court concluded that the Rhode Island statute violated the
Establishment Clause because it promoted "excessive government
entanglement., 23 In contrast, the Pennsylvania district court validated the
Pennsylvania statute.24
The Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania district court, affirmed
the Rhode Island district court,25 and held that both statutes contravened
the Establishment Clause. 26 Garnering criteria from prior cases, the Court
established a three-prong test for applying the Establishment Clause.27

16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Id. at 606.
18. Id. at 607 (citing Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1
(repealed 1980)).
19. Id. The supplement was not to exceed 15% of the teacher's current salary and, in any
case, the teacher's salary could not exceed the maximum paid to teachers in public schools. Id. To
be eligible, teachers had to teach at a nonpublic school where the average per student cost of secular
education was less than the average cost in public schools. Id.
20. Id. at 609 (citing Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 24
PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-08 (repealed 1977)).
21. Id. at 606-07. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the state Superintendent of Public
Instruction was authorized to purchase "'contracts"' for "'secular educational services."' Id. at 609.
22. See id. at 607-08, 610. The Rhode Island statute required that eligible schools submit
financial records proving per student expenditures on secular education. Id. at 607-08. The statute
also required that eligible teachers only teach public school subjects and use only public school
materials. Id. at 608. Furthermore, the statute required that eligible teachers agree in writing not to
teach religious courses while receiving the supplement. Id. The Pennsylvania statute limited
funding to courses in secular subjects, specifically: "mathematics, modern foreign languages,
physical science, and physical education." Id. at 610 (footnote omitted). The statute also required
that the state Superintendent of Public Instruction approve all textbooks and instructional materials.
Id. Finally, the law forbade reimbursement for any subject matter expressing religious teachings.
Id.
23. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 122 (D.R.I. 1970).
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 48-49 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
25. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
26. See id. at 607.
27. Id. at 612-13. The second prong of the Lemon test was derived from the Court's
decision in Allen v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The third prong
was taken from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
The Court
recognized
three evils
which the
Establishment Clause was intended to protect:
Published
by also
UF Law
Scholarship
Repository,
2006
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First, the government action must have a secular purpose.28 Second, it must
not advance or inhibit religion. 29 Third, the government action must not
' 30
promote "'excessive government entanglement with religion. '
According to the Court, a state action is unconstitutional if it violates any
of these three prongs.31

In applying the first prong of the test, the Court showed deference to
the stated legislative purposes and concluded that the legislatures did not
intend to advance religion.3 2 The Court, however, invalidated the statutes
under the third prong of the test, holding that the statutes involved
excessive entanglement between government and religion.33 The Court
held that despite the strict statutory restrictions designed to advance only
secular education,34 the statutes impermissibly entangled church and state
because religious instruction was "inevitably" linked with parochial
education.35

Twelve years later, the Supreme Court applied a modified version of
the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly.36 In Lynch, the question focused on
the inclusion of a nativity scene, or creche, in a city's Christmas display.37
Finding official sponsorship of religion and excessive entanglement, the
district court permanently enjoined the inclusion of the nativity in the
display, and the court of appeals affirmed.38
"'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."'
Id. at 612 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
28. Id. (defining the purpose prong).
29. Id. (defining the effect prong).
30. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (defining the entanglement prong).
31. See id. at 612-13.
32. Id. at 613. The statutes were enacted to improve the quality of "secular education in all
schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Id.
33. Id. at 614.
34. Id. at 613.
35. See id. at 615, 618-19. In finding excessive entanglement, the Court noted that both
statutes would require "comprehensive... state surveillance" to ensure that the First Amendment
was respected. Id. at 619, 621. The Court found that these increased contacts, at least under the
Rhode Island statute, would cause excessive entanglement. Id. at 619. The Court also noted that
eligible teachers under the Rhode Island statute would have difficulty remaining neutral. Id. at 61819. Finally, the Court reasoned that the statutes had the potential to incite political division along
religious lines, a principle evil that the First Amendment was intended to prevent. Id. at 622, 62324. This risk was intensified by the need for increasing annual appropriations. Id. at 623-24.
36. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. Id. at 670-71. The nativity scene-which had been part of the display for more than forty
years--consisted of the infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, shepherds, angels, animals, and kings. Id.
at 671. The nativity was one element of a larger Christmas display including, among other
decorations, Santa's sleigh, a Christmas tree, candy-striped poles, and carolers. Id. The city owned
all parts of the display. Id.
38. Id. at 672. Although the District Court recognized that the nativity did not promote
administrative entanglement with religion, the Court "found that excessive entanglement ha[d] been 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/5
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inclusion of the creche
did not contravene the Establishment Clause.3 9 In its reasoning, the Court
refused to confine itself to a single criterion or test. 4° Instead, the majority
examined the role of religion in American history, emphasizing the
"unbroken history" of government acknowledgment of religion in
American life.4 ' Rejecting an absolutist approach to applying the
Establishment Clause,42 the Court focused on the constitutionality of the
nativity in the context of the Christmas season.43 Ultimately, the Court
applied a less stringent version of the Lemon test. Under the first prong of
Lemon, the Court accepted the city's stated purpose of depicting the
origins of Christmas.' Second, while recognizing that the nativity may
confer some benefit on those of the Christian faith, the Court determined
that the inclusion of the Christian symbol was passive and did not advance
or inhibit religion.45 In making this determination, the Court noted that a
law is not unconstitutional simply because the law indirectly or remotely
advances religion.' Finally, the majority held that there was no
administrative entanglement47 and that political divisiveness alone cannot
invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.48
Further eroding Lemon, the Court in Marsh v. Chambers49 advanced an
alternative test for appropriate application of the Establishment
Clause-the history and tradition test.5" In Marsh, the Court considered
whether the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each session with
a prayer by a chaplain paid for by the state violated the Establishment
Clause.5 The district court enjoined the legislature from using public

fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including the creche in the celebration." Id.
39. Id. at 687.
40. Id. at 679.
41. Id. at 674-78.
42. Id. at 678.
43. Id. at 679.
44. Id. at 681.
45. See id. at 683.
46. Id.(quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973)).
47. Id. at 684.
48. Id. Justice O'Connor's concurrence provided a refined version of the first two prongs of the
Lemon test. See id. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under Justice O'Connor's first prong, the
government must prove that it does not have the purpose to convey a message endorsing or
disapproving of religion. ld. at 691. Under the second prong, the government must prove that it does
not have the effect of communicating a message advancing or disproving of religion. Id. at 692.
49. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
50. ld. at 786, 790-92.
51. Id. at 784. The chaplain was a Presbyterian minister who had served in the role since
1965. Id. at 785. The chaplain was paid with public funds at a salary of $319.75 per month. Id. at
784-85.by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
Published
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funds to pay the chaplain, but refused to invalidate the practice of
beginning each session with prayer.52 Applying the three-part Lemon test,
the court of appeals modified the district court's injunction and enjoined
the whole chaplaincy practice.53
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Nebraska Legislature's
chaplaincy practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.54 Marking a
dramatic shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court abandoned
the stringent requirements initiated by the Lemon Court twelve years
earlier.55 In the alternative, the Court focused on the extensive history and
tradition of legislative prayer in the United States.56 Unlike the Lemon test,
the history and tradition test focused primarily on the Founders' intent.57
While recognizing that historical patterns alone cannot justify
constitutional violations, the Court concluded that the past practices of the
Founders clearly disclosed their intent to allow legislative prayer.5 8
On facts remarkably similar to the instant case, the Court returned to
the Lemon test in McCreary County v. ACLU. 9 In McCreary County,
petitioners installed within one year three different displays of the Ten
Commandments in the county courthouse in McCreary County,
Kentucky.' Respondents filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction to

52. Id. at 785. The District Court also enjoined the State from publishing the prayers at the
public's expense, holding that this practice violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 785 n.3.
However, because petitioners did not challenge this part of the District Court's decision, the
Supreme Court did not address the issue. Id.
53. Id. at 786.
54. Id. at 792-93, 795.
55. See id. at 790-92.
56. See generally id. at 786-92.
57. See id. at 787-91.
58. See. id. The Court specifically cited the adoption of the chaplaincy practice by the
Founders at the First Continental Congress in 1774. Id. at 787. In the Court's reasoning, it would
be inconsistent to impose more stringent standards today than the Founders imposed on the federal
government. Id. at 790-91.
59. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734 (2005) (5-4 decision). Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the
court in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Id. at 2727. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia entered a dissenting opinion, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, however, only joined in Parts II
and III. Id. at 2748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2730 (majority opinion). The first display consisted of a large, gold-framed copy
of the King James version of the Ten Commandments installed in the county courthouse. Id. at
2728. After suits were initiated claiming Establishment Clause violations, the counties adopted
resolutions authorizing expanded versions of the original display. Id. at 2729. In addition to the
original gold-framed copies of the Ten Commandments, the second display included eight other
documents in smaller frames with religious themes. Id. After the District Court entered an
injunction ordering the removal of the second display, the county installed the third and final
display in the courthouse. Id. at 2730.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/5
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enjoin the third display.61 Following the three-prong Lemon analysis, the
district court found that the display lacked a secular purpose and ordered
its removal,62 and the appellate court affirmed.63
The narrow question in McCreary County was whether the first prong
of Lemon, the purpose prong, required consideration of the display over
time.' The Supreme Court determined that the evolution of the exhibit
was relevant to the first prong of Lemon.65 While concluding that the Court
will generally defer to the legislature's stated objectives, the secular
purpose must still be legitimate, "not a sham, and not merely secondary to
a religious objective."' Based on the record leading up to the third display,
the majority found a predominantly religious purpose and upheld the
preliminary injunction.67 In reaching this conclusion, therefore, the Court
reaffirmed the importance of the first prong of Lemon.
On the same day the Court invalidated the display in McCreary County,
the Court upheld the Ten Commandments monument in the instant case.68

61. Id. at 2731. The third display was part of a larger exhibit entitled "The Foundations of
American Law and Government Display." Id. In addition to the Ten Commandments, the display
included "copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics
of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the
Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice." Id. Each document contained a "statement
about its historical and legal significance." Id.
The statement on the Ten Commandments read:
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of Western
legal thought and the formation of our country. That influence is clearly seen in
the Declaration of Independence, which declared that 'We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit
of Happiness.' The Ten Commandments provide the moral background of the
Declaration of Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition.
Id.
62. Id. The counties claimed that the purpose of the display was to demonstrate that the Ten
Commandments were part of American law and to educate citizens. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2728.
65. See id. at 2736-37.
66. Id. at 2735.
67. Id. at 2745.
68. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (4-1-4 decision). Chief Justice
Rehnquist announced the judgment and delivered an opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined. Id. at 2858 (plurality opinion). Justices Scalia and Thomas also filed concurring
opinions, and Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment. Id. at 2864 (Scalia,
J., concurring); id. at 2864 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Additionally, Justice Stevens entered a dissenting opinion that Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2873
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, Justices O'Connor and Souter also filed dissenting opinions. Id.
at 2891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting). Because Justice Breyer

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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Unlike the McCreary County analysis, the plurality's analysis in the
instant case rejected application of the Lemon test, concluding that the test
was not useful in evaluating "the sort of passive monument that Texas
ha[d] erected on its Capitol grounds."69 Instead, the plurality focused on
the nature of the monument and the nation's history.70 As justification for
the Texas monument, the plurality cited official acknowledgments of
religion by government officials and physical manifestations of the Ten
Commandments in the nation's capital. 71 The plurality also credited prior
Establishment Clause decisions and the religious references expressed
within them.72 Finally, based on the passive nature of the monument and
the deep-seated history of religion and the Ten Commandments, the
plurality determined that the monument did not constitute constitutional
infringement under the Establishment Clause. 73 As such, the instant case
marked a return to the history and tradition analysis set forth in Marsh v.
Chambers.74 However, because the plurality did not overrule Lemon, the
fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence remains undetermined.
By refusing to settle on a consistent standard, the instant Court has
utterly failed to provide the lower courts with any principled guideposts
for application of the Lemon test. While some Establishment Clause cases
explicitly refuse application of Lemon,75 other cases simply ignore the
Lemon analysis.7 6 In striking contrast, the Court frequently points to
Lemon as the governing test in Establishment Clause challenges, notably

joined with the majority in McCreary County invalidating the public display of the Ten
Commandments and applying the Lemon test, the future of Justice Breyer's concurrence is
uncertain. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that no single mechanical formula can
concurring). Rather than bright line
adequately draw a line in each case. Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J.,
tests, Justice Breyer maintained that the most appropriate test involves the exercise of legal
judgment, taking into account the context of the case and the underlying purposes of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 2869.
69. Id. at 2861 (plurality opinion).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2861-63. In particular, the Court recognized representations of the Ten
Commandments in their own courtroom, in the rotunda of the Library of Congress, in the National
Archives, and outside the federal courthouse for the Court of Appeals and the District Court for the
District of Columbia. Id. at 2862-63.
72. Id. at 2861-62.
73. See id. at 2864.
74. 463 U.S. 783, 786, 790-92 (1983).
75. See, e.g., id.
at 793-95 (applying the history and tradition analysis); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (finding that Lemon was not useful where there was substantial evidence
of overt discrimination among religions).
76. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (upholding school
programs on neutrality grounds); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-20
(2001) (failing to apply the Lemon test).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/5
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applying the first prong of the Lemon test in McCreary County."
Similarly, the district court's attempt in the instant case to apply the Lemon
analysis to the Texas monument had a large degree of precedential
support.7" Nevertheless, the plurality in the instant case dismissed the
district court's reasoning and arbitrarily rejected Lemon.7 9 If the district
court improperly applied Lemon to the instant case, it was most likely due
to the inconsistency of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Despite the need for a clear and consistent standard, the plurality's
rejection of Lemon is brief and troublesome. By applying a fact specific
analysis, the plurality rejected Lemon based on the "passive" nature of the
monument.8 ' However, in making this determination, the plurality did not
provide a clear definition of what constitutes "passive."" Moreover, it did
not explain whether courts must reject Lemon in every instance of a
passive religious monument. Compounding the confusion, the Court found
a similar Ten Commandments display in McCreary County non-passive
and applied the Lemon test.12 As such, the standard for application of
Lemon remains uncertain and courts are without clear guidance. Absent
any standard, courts are free to manipulate application of Lemon to fit the
goals of the judiciary.8 3
The plurality's reliance on the history and tradition analysis further
reinforces the inconsistency of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First,
the application of the test in the instant case is inconsistent with prior
applications of the analysis. In Marsh, the Court found the history and
tradition analysis appropriate because the Founders practiced chaplaincy
at the Constitutional Convention.' The Ten Commandments monument
in the instant case, however, is not a historic practice or historic
memorabilia. Justice Stevens observed this concern when he contended

77. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733-34, 2745 (2005). Because the Court
decided McCreary County and Van Orden on the same day, future courts will likely attempt to
distinguish McCrearyCounty from Van Ordenwhen determining whether to apply the Lemon test.
Due to the close similarities between the cases and the Court's failure to establish a bright line test,
future courts will likely find this difficult. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (applying Lemon); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 681 (1984) (utilizing a modified version of Lemon).
79. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005) (plurality opinion).
80. See id.
81. The Court seems to base the passive nature of the monument on the fact that the
monument has "dual significance," respecting both religion and government. Id. at 2864. The Court
also appears to rely on the fact that the Petitioner apparently walked by the monument for a number
of years before bringing suit. Id.
82. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2731, 2734-35.
83. Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he unintelligibility of this Court's precedent raises the
further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of Establishment Clause
challenges turns on judicial predilections." Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983).
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that the history and tradition analysis is only marginally relevant to the
instant case since it does not concern 'issues of historic preservation. 85
Hence, with disagreement over the test's application and lack of a
principled rule, the
plurality again failed to provide the proper guidance to
86
the lower courts.
Second, by basing its analysis on varying accounts of historical
evidence, the history and tradition analysis fails to provide lower courts
with a test capable of consistent application. The difficulty in applying the
history and tradition analysis is illustrated in the instant case. Regarding
official government acknowledgments of religion, the plurality cited
various proclamations in justifying Texas monuments.87 However, other
statements of the Founders could very well be utilized to invalidate the
Ten Commandments monument.88 Moreover, public acknowledgments
may be unreliable since they are not always the clear expression of the
government, but often only the views of the individual speaker.89
In relying on arbitrary proclamations, the plurality has provided a great
degree of flexibility to lower courts. Instead of citing arbitrary
proclamations by the Founders, the better approach probably would have
been to quote more persuasive statements and documents. Justice Stevens
favored this approach in his dissenting opinion in the instant case; he
found proclamations of the Founders problematic since they were neither
announced at the Constitutional Convention nor espoused in the text of the
Constitution. 90°

85. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2876-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the contrary, Justice
Stevens argued that "mere compilation of religious symbols" and "simplistic commentary on the
various ways in which religion has played a role in American life" avoided the important issue
presented in the case. Id.
86. See generally Monica Vila, Comment, Constitutional Law: Thou Shalt Not Establish
Religion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 819 (2004) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of
Marsh and misapplication of the Lemon test).
87. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion). Among the various proclamations cited
by the plurality is George Washington's Thanksgiving Day Proclamation which recommended to
the American people "'aday of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging,
with grateful hearts, the many and signal favors of Almighty God."' Id. Likewise, the concurrence
in McCreary County quoted George Washington's Farewell Address declaring that "'reason and
experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principle."' McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2749 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. In particular, Justice Stevens noted Thomas Jefferson's refusal to issue the Thanksgiving
proclamations that Washington had embraced on the grounds that the proclamation would violate
the Establishment Clause. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice
Stevens also cited James Madison's comments stating that Congress's appointment of a paid
chaplain was a deviation from principles separating religion and government. Id.
89. Id. at 2883.
90. Id.
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By applying the history and tradition analysis of Marsh, the plurality
arbitrarily rejected the Lemon test and relied on a test fraught with debate
and controversy. Moreover, by upholding the Ten Commandments
monument in the instant case and invalidating the display in McCreary
County, the Court made the Establishment Clausejurisprudence even more
mystifying. 9 As such, the instant case presented serious unanswered
questions. Notably, what governs lower courts in deciding whether to
apply Lemon or some alternative test? Moreover, is the history and
tradition test of Marsh solid precedent or a judicial anomaly?92
In the instant case, the plurality recognized two responsibilities
inherent in the Establishment Clause:93 First, the Clause compels the Court
to maintain a division between church and state; and second, the Clause
requires that the Court not evince hostility towards religion by disallowing
government recognition of the nation's religious heritage. 94 In order to
respect both aims, the Court must provide lower courts a clear test capable
of consistent application in Establishment Clause challenges. Without
principled guidance, lower courts will continue to apply whatever analysis
best suits their intended results. 95

91. In light of the 4-1-4 decision in the instant case and recent membership changes to the
Court, the precedential authority of Van Orden in Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be
weak. Although the confirmation of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. may not heavily influence
the balance of the Court, the additional confirmation of Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. may have a
significant impact in future Establishment Clause conflicts. As many predict, Justice Alito's
jurisprudence may in fact fall along the lines of Justices Scalia and Thomas. Thus, in replacing
Justice O'Connor, a major swing vote, Justice Alito may shift the balance of the Court to the right
and influence future Establishment Clause cases. See Robin Toner & Adam Liptak, 2 Camps,
Playing Down Nuances, Stake Out Firm Stands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A25. Furthermore,
due to the retirement of Justice O'Connor, the Court may once and for all abandon the
Establishment Clause test set forth by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch. See supra
note 48.
92. Considering the recent changes to the Court, the Court may be more likely to return to
the Marsh reasoning and uphold religious expression based on the history and tradition test.
93. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2859 (plurality opinion).
94. Id.
95. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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